









A great deal of scholarship and journalism has been devoted to theorising 
and commenting on the predicament of Palestinians in the Occupied 
Territories living in the shadow of a foreign army and, arguably, Israel’s 
failure to meet standards of equality expected of a democratic nation. In news 
reports there is a daily variety of hypocrisy alongside well-intentioned 
analysis. It is difficult to know how to begin to talk about this part of the 
world. A historical perspective? Sociological? Psychological? Political? Is it 
advisable to introduce a personal note? Would that help, or would it lead to 
indulgent subjectivity? Yet politics is personal not only to those directly 
involved, but also to others who are moved to pity or contempt or any number 
of powerful feelings regarding other people, regardless of nationality, 
political persuasion, or religion. One’s sense of self, of belonging, is 
inevitably allied with the formation of allegiances and political loyalties, 
which are forged less by careful critical thought than emotional reactivity 
and may not be within our conscious control. Gilles Deleuze warns us against 
the “terrifying will to power” of dreams.1 Our ambitions and cravings may 
not be halted out of consideration for the effects they will inevitably have on 
other people on this planet, pullulating with countless desire-fuelled dreams 
that are continually colliding, like particles in the Large Hadron Collider.  
Dreams fuel stories. This essay considers the collision of narrative 
and counter-narrative in Israel/Palestine, and how spoken and written 
histories, or descriptions of places, events, or activities when viewed 
though a particular lens, influence and even create  socio-political  realities.   
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Israel/Palestine is comprised of several ethno-religious tribal groups; yet, as 
will be discussed, today the dimensions of Jewish and Palestinian dreams 
and the arc of their stories are largely dictated by the aspirations of 
particularly influential subsets within the Ashkenazi Jewish tribe. This is 
why, in order to look at the power of discourse to build or break nations, I 
will focus largely on certain Ashkenazi narratives. I should add that I do not 
think I have yet acquired the authority or background to critique Palestinian 
views. 
This essay often refers to ideas of Judith Butler and Hannah Arendt. 
In the middle of the last century Arendt sought to explicate the possibilities 
for a Jewish homeland—without sovereignty—and that without Arab-Jewish 
political co-operation at all levels of government “the whole Jewish venture 
in Palestine is doomed” either to defeat, or to “victory” existing as small 
“warrior tribe” within an utterly hostile environment.2 More recently, Butler 
has written of the necessity for “an ethical and political concern for the unjust 
political dispossession of others,” and is profoundly concerned at how the 
Israeli Ashkenazi and Jewish diasporic populace has drawn back from the 
Jewish tradition of ethics, which emphasised social justice, a central 
component of diasporic Jewish identity based on the concept of tikkun olam, 
or ‘world healing’.3 Instead, fear-based aggression against enemies, real and 
perceived, has become entrenched, breeding a self-destructive self-hatred as 
well as hatred of the Other—ideas to be developed here in due course. 
The first section of this essay will refer to some of the ways in which 
the stories we tell of ourselves to others represent less who we are than who 
we want to be—or to be perceived as being—regardless of countermanding 
evidence. These stories emerge from our histories, are driven by desire, and 
are solidified in the written word; our lexical choices both create and reflect 
our reality. Particular discourses concerning Israel/Palestine announce or 
camouflage personal or political intent; encourage or incapacitate 
imagination; liberate or control populations; enable compassion or exploit a 
sense of victimhood, or of blaming and shaming. The latter part of the article 
is concerned with narratives that run counter to the current status quo, or that 
reflect on ideas of those who continue to navigate seemingly impossible 
pathways between the polarities of Israel/Palestine, that enable glimmers of 
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hope. To be clear: I am not speaking of optimism, but hope according to 
Václav Havel’s formulation—“the ability to work for something because it 
is good, not just because it stands the chance to succeed”—which is essential, 
for without it only despair is possible.4  
For now, though, here are two contradictory views simultaneously 
upheld with regard to Israel/Palestine: 
1. Since the Naqba (‘Catastrophe’ for Palestinians, War of 
Independence for Jews) Palestinians have suffered incremental erosion of 
social justice, from small, retail cruelties to massive disenfranchisement 
through the destruction of property and illegal land-grabs. These are the 
subtle and gross mortifications experienced by people in the occupied 
territories and are all aspects of a strategy of wilfully engendered 
hopelessness by successive Israeli governments, a “regime of humiliation,”5 
exercised so that these people will be compelled, at last, to just leave and let 
the Jews have the land that Zionists claim as their own. 
2. The Jewish people have historically been treated with great cruelty 
and injustice; they have been subject to every known torment from insult and 
humiliation to genocide. The State of Israel is the Jews’ rightful home, 
promised to them by God and sanctioned by legal and political processes. Its 
existence, seen always in the shadow of the Holocaust, guarantees that such 
a horror will never be repeated, for now, the Jewish nation has a recognised 
state. Yet Jews are still suffering unremitting attacks: from anti-Semites 
globally and locally from Palestinian terrorists. Palestinian terror 
organisation Hamas specifically targets civilians, refuses to recognize 
Israel’s right to exist, and has vowed to drive the Jews into the sea. 
The above two paragraphs comprise two obviously simplified 
perceptions of the ‘Israel/Palestine conflict’,6 a descriptor that conjures an 
image of two embattled sides pitted against each other. While it is certainly 
true that Israelis do live in fear of terrorist attacks, a clear imbalance of power 
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produces a skewed assertion regarding what might arguably be described as 
a one-sided war of attrition. As Judith Butler insists, it is only “once political 
conditions of equality are established, [that we can] then perhaps begin to 
talk within terms of equality.”7 Otherwise, words fail us. 
 
Constructing ‘True Images Out of Words’  
The language of heroism, denial, euphemism, and ambiguity are ways to 
market a nation. There are maps of Israel/Palestine in textbooks, tourist 
guides and other official Israeli publications showing the West Bank as part 
of Israel. Julie Peteet notes that the Jewish population is included in Israel’s 
official statistics of the West Bank’s population, but not the Muslim or 
Christian, affirming a wishfully constructed imaginary of a Jewish 
democracy without Palestinians.8 The World Zionist Organisation refers to 
the land from the Jordan River to the Jordanian border by the biblical names, 
‘Judea and Samaria’, even though the West Bank is regarded as Occupied 
Territory by the United Nations, the European Union, and the International 
Court of Justice. Indeed, Zionism’s “narrow set of crucial myths: the biblical 
story of exile, the description of Palestine as a ‘land without a people’ before 
the arrival of the Jews … the categorization of all forms of resistance to Israel 
as anti-Semitic terrorism, and the description of all Israeli actions as 
defensive” has been extremely successful.9 Yet Donna Divine, who is, 
according to the Jewish and Israeli news source The Algemeiner, is one of 
“the top people positively influencing Jewish life,”10 contends that it is the 
abuse of language by leftist journalists and scholars that threatens Israel’s 
international reputation.  
Divine’s article ‘Word Crimes’ includes impassioned refutations of 
the arguments of several thinkers, and she rightly points out that “questions 
of language are questions about the distribution of power.”11 However, she 
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does not attend to evidence that the allocation of power to Jewish 
(predominantly white and male) constituents is far greater and that 
overwhelming weight has been accorded Zionist mythology mentioned 
above. In this battle for word domination, Israel continues to be presented by 
academics such as Divine and in the global North in general, as a stronghold 
of Western European values of democracy, regardless of the fact that one 
ethnic group controls the apparatus of the State. Ethnicities other than Jewish 
may vote in Israel and they may even enter parliament, but only so long as 
their activities are not seen to pose a threat to “exclusive Jewish ownership 
and control of the state.”12 Oren Yiftachel has argued that Israeli democracy 
is in fact a façade that “uses the state apparatus to ethnicize the territory and 
society in question.”13  
Divine’s claim that Israel’s reputation has been tarnished is certainly 
correct, but arguably this as less to do with the lexical choices of leftist 
scholars and journalists attempting to redress the imbalance of power, and 
more to do with the development of policies of closure and separation of 
Palestinian villages, and Israeli political and military actions which have 
been decried by the UN and the international community. Such actions 
include illegal West Bank settlements, demolitions, retaliatory military 
overkill, and discrimination in law and education.14 Divine refers to the 
language and the “the serious weaknesses” in Jasbir Puar’s argument that 
Israel “has assaulted the bodies and minds of Palestinians,” yet she fails to 
demonstrate where Puar is wrong, or how Saree Makdisi “distort[s] the 
Israeli political system.”15 This reader assumed that later the author would 
take both Makdisi and Puar to task through analysis of their claims, but this 
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was not forthcoming in ‘Word Crimes’. Divine acknowledges Edward Said’s 
point that “language was critical to maintaining power,” and adds that it 
“serve[s] as an instrument for dismantling it as well.”16 Both statements are 
true, but seemingly Divine finds any attempts to question the Israeli power 
structure morally wrong at the most fundamental level. Following this logic, 
much of the language used in critique is, for her, necessarily “misused.”  
Propagandists of all stripes are well aware of the production of 
ideological effects via discourse17 and that words are a “mode of action.”18 
The symbolic intervention of naming, in the Israeli context, was certainly a 
political action from the time of the State’s conception. The earliest leaders 
began a trend wherein new immigrants were encouraged to adopt names 
reminiscent of or directly borrowed from the Bible; for example, David 
Gruen = Ben Gurion, Ariel Scheinerman = Sharon, Golda Meyerson = Meir. 
With the advent of statehood, the brief of the new Israel Place Names 
committee was to rename Palestinian sites to recreate a sense of an ancient 
homeland, an narrative of origin, thus severing bonds with the Diaspora and 
the ‘shameful’ Jewish history when “the Jew had lived as a slave 
[considering] suffering and silence his highest virtues.”19 The action of 
renaming separated Zionists from this heritage while creating a sense of 
historic entitlement to ‘Eretz Israel’, effectively making it “a real artefact … 
in line with the biblical era on the one hand and modern colonial ideology on 
the other.”20 The political landscape has been reconstructed with 
Hebraicisations: partial or complete replacement of Arabic place names with 
Hebrew ones which in highlights Jewish identification with the land while 
symbolically severing Palestinian connections to it.21 The same is true of the 
use of the term ‘Arab’ to refer to indigenous Palestinians. As a bookseller I 
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spoke to in East Jerusalem in 2019 eloquently explained: “The minute I’m 
not a Palestinian I’m being deprived of my cultural identity [referred to] by 
my language and my ethnic identity which is, I’m an Arab … by not saying 
I’m Palestinian is saying that there is no Palestine.”  
The experience of victimhood and humiliation are common to both 
Palestinians and Jews, and according to Arland Jacobson, “constitutive, 
fundamental to [the] identity … of two peoples trapped in their own 
narratives of suffering.”22 Palestine was controlled by the Ottoman Empire, 
then British Empires, followed by Jordanian rule before the advent of Israel. 
Israelis of European heritage live within the penumbra of their long history 
of persecution. These two stories form a dialogue wherein each fails to 
recognise the suffering and victimisation of the other. One obvious example 
is that many Israeli Jews deny or ignore the Naqba; many Palestinians deny 
or ignore the Holocaust. Both sides are vying for power over nothing less 
than the construction of reality itself. Ilan Gur-Ze’Ev and Ilan Pappé frame 
it this way: “The struggle over control of the memory of victimization is a 
matter of life and death, and suffering and death—as actuality and as 
memory—are philosophical, political and existential issues.”23 Yet as 
Jacobson mentions, the role Palestinians have played in the suffering of 
Jewish people is negligible in comparison to the Jewish experience of 
torment at the hands of Europeans, or the pain that the Jewish people have 
caused the Palestinians in recent history.24 The Palestinian Naqba/Israeli War 
of Independence in 1948 claimed almost 80% of the region of Palestine and 
since then, much of Israeli media has been engaged in what Baruch 
Kimmerling uncompromisingly calls the task of “hermetic self-persuasion of 
righteousness.”25  
Careful selection and distortion of events was, and continues to be, 
exercised by much of the Israeli media whose uncritical acceptance of 
official accounts disables other interpretations; for example, reference to 
what was once known as the ‘War of the Settlements’ became ‘War of 
Survival’, and the term ‘occupation’ has largely disappeared.26 This closing 
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down of political criticality—although enjoying a brief renaissance in the 
1990s during the prime ministership of assassinated Yitzhak Rabin—has 
extended its reach in recent years. Edward Alexander in Jews Against 
Themselves goes so far as to assert that questioning Israeli defence strategies, 
raising doubts about certain Zionist precepts, supporting divestments and 
boycotts of Israel, and expressing concern regarding the use of the term 
‘antisemitism’ (to be discussed in more detail later) makes scholars such as 
Daniel Boyarin, Martin Jay, and in particular, Judith Butler, “professorial 
advocates of suicide bombing of Israeli citizens.”27 Israel is presented as 
being under “siege,”28 a descriptor that would make a fine debating point 
with Gazans. He also mentions that certain Jewish intellectuals (“co-
conspirators” in “economic warfare”) are unable to recognise Israel as the 
“the very state upon which their identity rests.”29 This seems a particularly 
skewed perspective given that Jewish people have existed in the Diaspora 
since the Roman destruction of the second temple of Jerusalem in the first 
century of the common era. 
 
Antisemitism and ‘Antisemitism’ 
Antisemitism is undoubtedly rife. The Anti-Defamation League provides a 
long list of instances of vandalism, as well as verbal and physical attacks, 
towards Jewish people globally for 2019. Earlier that year the Guardian 
reported a 60% increase in antisemitic attacks in Germany and a 74% 
increase in France.30 However, there is a dialectical accusation of 
‘antisemitism’ that must be interrogated. This label, ironically, tends to be 
levelled at those Jews who may be opposed to Zionism or who criticise 
oppressive Israeli government policies rather than the politicians who write 
them and the people who endorse them. Judith Butler is one such thinker 
who has been labelled antisemitic, either directly or by implication, by those 
whose stated intention is to protect Israel and Jewish people elsewhere.31 Yet 
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Butler reminds us that, “there are Jewish values of cohabitation with the non-
Jew that are part of the very ethical substance of diasporic Jewishness.” She 
continues to speak of that commitment,  
to social equality and social justice [as] an integral part of Jewish 
secular, socialist, and religious traditions. [Yet] It has become 
necessary to reiterate this argument over and against a public 
discourse that assumes any criticism of the Israeli occupation...is anti-
Semitic or anti-Jewish…In other words, it would be a painful irony 
indeed if the Jewish struggle for social justice were itself cast as anti-
Jewish.32  
Alan Wolfe too expresses dismay at Israeli nationalism and the uncritical 
support of many Diaspora Jews of Israeli government policies, which he sees 
as their “abandonment of the ethical and universalist foundations of 
Judaism.”33 Klug argues that what is at stake is the Jewish tradition of 
criticism based on ‘readings of readings, words about words, along with their 
translation into deeds’ which represents a striving towards justice. He goes 
so far as to say that the Jewish State has become “an idol by another name.”34  
The defensive catch cry of ‘antisemitism’ delegitimises any kind of 
critical thinking about Israel/Palestine and confounds, through intransigent 
denialism, any movement towards the possibility of negotiations with 
Palestinians, let alone any demonstration of a fellow-feeling towards the 
cohabitants of the land or with others in the region. At the time of the Arab 
Spring, for instance, Benn wrote that Israel might have, “reached out to the 
revolutionaries, celebrating their achievement or suggesting we need to 
know them better since they might share values and ambitions with secular, 
liberal Israelis.” Instead, the Israeli government preferred to support the 
largely autocratic Middle Eastern status quo and ‘regional stability’ rather 
than the people straining towards democracy, a political value which, it 
seems, is to be “praised in principle, but considered perilous in practice.”35  
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Criticisms of Israeli policy may be more subtly undermined by 
referring to them as antisemitic in ‘effect’ if not ‘intent’, a distinction made 
by Harvard Law president, Lawrence Summers, when criticising Judith 
Butler as antisemitic.36 Yet if for fear of judgment of ‘intent’ by such as 
Summers or Alexander, or anxiety that the ‘effect’ of critiquing Zionism or 
sympathising with Palestinians, could damage the current Israeli status quo, 
then then silence is the only option: Israeli government policies may not be 
questioned, statesmen such as Netanyahu must go unchallenged. The 
insistence on “sentimental and blinding communitarianism”37 is not new, and 
neither is silencing oppositional voices. Yet as Arendt notes in Eichmann in 
Jerusalem and elsewhere, and for which comment she was ostracised, it is 
perilous to focus only on the dislike one may be accorded while failing to 
reflect on the reasons for this, justified or otherwise, and one’s own possible 
complicity, however unwilling.38 For Arendt, these reasons were not based 
simply on an ‘inevitable’ gentile hatred of Jews as a people, but also on 
Jewish historical failure to engage politically when they did have some 
power to do so.  
 
Some Discourses of Jewish Identity 
This section looks at certain themes and rhetorical turns which have been 
chosen for discussion for their contribution to nationalistic fervour, or their 
contemporary political or economic clout, or their historic resonance and 
therefore ongoing cultural influence.  
 
Diasporic Identity and Israel 
The strongly held belief that Zionism enabled the Jewish people to return to 
their ‘natural home’ is disputable. According to readings by which Diaspora 
Jews lived for millennia, the people were “forever unconnected with a 
particular land, a people that calls into question the idea that people must 
have a land in order to be a people.”39 The lack of a sovereign state is often 
perceived as a fundamental weakness; however, it can instead be regarded as 
a profound strength, even a model that others might emulate as a testimony 
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to the power of endurance: the opposite of weakness. Discussion of diasporic 
consciousness becomes the focus of attention later on; for now, though, I just 
want to stress that dispersion need not be perceived as a humiliating 
condition, for Jewish identity need not depend on nativism—indeed, Judith 
Butler has argued that Diaspora is a ‘core value’ of Jewishness. For Daniel 
and Jonathan Boyarin it exists, “as a perpetual, creative … tension.”40  
 
Shame 
Concealed and cowering—the sons of the Maccabees! 
The seed of saints, the scions of the lions! 
Who, crammed by scores in all the sanctuaries of their shame… 
The scurrying of roaches was their flight; 
They died like dogs…41    
Both Hebrew and Arabic names—Abraham/Ibrahim, David/Dawud, 
Joshua/Yehoshua/Yusha—recall a time of conquest and heroism by kings 
and generals, the sort of leaders that men felt they needed in the Bronze and 
Iron Ages. They remain an intractable representation of masculine strength. 
This story of vigorous, commanding, imperious masculinity contrasts 
dramatically with the archetypical pre-World War II exilic Jew of the 
Diaspora: a timorous, studious character, an image now held in contempt by 
many, as reflected above in the words of Israel’s national poet. There are few 
insults one might level at the victim of a crime, particularly ones of such 
horrific proportions as the Holocaust, that are as dire as feebleness or worse, 
complicity.  
The intergenerational, internalised nature of antisemitism’s legacy 
hangs on a sense of shame of those forebears’ humiliating failure to defend 
themselves. The phrase ‘self-hating Jew’ is often traced to philosopher 
Theodor Lessing’s eponymous 1930 book, Jewish Self-Hatred, though the 
idea is older; for example, it is found in the 1919 speech of journalist Anton 
Kuh titled ‘The Tragedy of the Jew’.42 Lewis Aron and Karen Starr mention 
the association of the circumcised penis and effeminacy and the absurd 
antisemitic theory that circumcision is inherited, rather than acquired.43 This 
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image of the feminised man is aligned with other ‘Jewish’ attributes such as 
‘primitivity, degeneracy, and disease’—a far cry from the image of nobility 
and power of the ancient patriarchs mentioned previously and idolised by 
Bialik, greatly exacerbating the sense of injury. According to James Gilligan 
and James Vrettos in their study of men imprisoned for violent acts, the 
“sense of having been wronged, is seen as recompense for those injuries, 
recent or historical.”44 
One traditional reading included in Passover is “In every generation 
they have risen up against us to annihilate us,” a reminder of the perceived 
inevitability of persecution. This very statement was used as a headline in 
one of Israel’s major newspapers during the Second Intifada.45 It may be, and 
indeed was, read as a justifiable call to arms, yet this does not obviate another 
interpretation: an opportunistic preying on the entrenched—or indeed, 
historical—sense of vulnerability of their Jewish readership. This phrase sees 
little if any difference between the Holocaust and Palestinian attacks; no 
recognition of the differing roles played by Nazis and Palestinians. In the 
same publication, the strength of Israel is evoked in contrast with its shame 
at having thus far failed to retaliate adequately: “We are a tremendously 
powerful nation, almost daily put to shame by weak enemies who attack it.”46 
Readers are exhorted to embrace wholeheartedly the exercise of full Israeli 
force.  
 
Israel as Western 
Jewish return to Israel meant a rupture with diasporic Jewishness, even 
though a defining characteristic of sense of self amongst Israel’s Ashkenazi 
population is its cultural identification with Europe. That is, while admiration 
for and identification with the Europe that produced so much cultural wealth 
remains undimmed, a peculiar cognitive dissonance enables a disconnect 
from the fact that it also produced the ferocious antisemitism which 
decimated European Jewry. Thus, we see a paradoxical identification with 
gentile Europe alongside disassociation from Jews of Europe; divorce from 
the ‘weak’ shtetl-dwellers alongside pride in European heritage. Perhaps it 
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is in ironic instances such as this that the storied substance of political 
structures becomes particularly clear. 
As the then Israeli Foreign Minister Ehud Barak stated twenty-five 
years ago, Israel is a building, a “villa in the middle of the jungle” which he 
later amended to, “an oasis fortress in the desert.”47 It is considered a Western 
stronghold modelled on European traditions untainted by antisemitic 
brutality, set in opposition to the ‘barbaric’ Middle Eastern ‘desert’. Another 
irony is that the Jewish patriarchs and heroes were indisputably Middle 
Eastern (and not necessarily from the land now designated as Israel). They 
were Arab Jews, a term often used derogatively. This marks an ethical and 
historical failure of Zionist ideology, which Yehouda Shenhav claims has 
“destroyed the Arab-Jewish option in language and space.”48 As Benn, 
editor-in-chief of Israeli newspaper Haaretz, remarked, “the benchmarks are 
always the US, western Europe, or countries of the OECD. It’s never Egypt, 
Syria, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority or even Dubai.”49 Yet diverse 
thinkers, including Judith Butler, Alain Epp Weaver, Daniel and Jonathan 
Boyarin, Ella Shohat, Atalia Omer, Hannah Arendt, and Rabbi Marcus 
Ehrenpreis, have declared that this need not be the case, as will be discussed 
towards the end of this article.  
 
Entrepreneurial Chutzpah 
Today Israel enjoys a reputation for entrepreneurial adventurousness and the 
success of its high-tech industries and start-ups. The narrator of a 
promotional video for Skillshare,50 cites the spirit of chutzpah as a primary 
reason for Israeli indomitability in the market. It is worth noting though, that 
traditionally, chutzpah was associated with arrogance, brazenness, and 
amorality and the perpetrator was generally despised for their lack of 
personal responsibility—although it is occasionally afforded respect in 
religious literature for its biblical association with spirited and ethical 
inquiry.51 It is the second reading of chutzpah that is best known, and in 
 
 
47 Benn, ‘Israel is blind to the Arab revolution’. 
48 Yehouda Shenhav, ‘The Palestinian Nakba and the Arab-Jewish Melancholy: An Essay on 
Sovereignty and Translation’, Jews and the ends of theory (New York, NY: Fordham 
University Press, 2019), p. 54. 
49 Benn, ‘Israel is blind to the Arab revolution’. 
50 Polymatter, in conjunction with Skillshare, ‘Why Israel is a Tech Capital of the World’, 
YouTube, at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RuPx61911Oo, accessed 12/12/2020.  
 




modern Israel it is sometimes simplistically associated with the image of a 
tiny, brave nation reaping the just rewards for its courage in facing off 
terrifying odds recalls the story of David and Goliath, and if one overlooks 
‘David’s geopolitical clout today, it is a major source of national pride and 
part of national identity-building.  
Skillshare refers later to the virtues of long-term military service, 
where young people learn skills transferable to the workplace. This is true: 
the IDF’s largest unit, Unit 8200 (similar to the US National Security 
Agency), acts as a ‘feeder’ for developing cybersecurity companies in the 
civilian world.52 Yet The Citizen Lab “has identified over 100 cases of 
abusive targeting of human rights defenders and journalists across the globe 
including countries in Africa, Asia, Europe, the Middle East.”53 While the 
NSO (Niv, Shalev and Omri Group) claims that its Pegasus spyware is a 
means of fighting global terror, a senior researcher at The Citizen Lab, John 
Scott-Railton has commented on Twitter that the company looked “much 
more like a hacking-as-a-service than software developers”.54 The national 
mythology encourages the denial of the malign aspects of Israeli military and 
industrial successes and focuses on identification with the nation’s forward 
moving, potentially world-improving STEM excellence, as emphasised in 
Skillshare’s declaration that Israeli brilliance has prevailed, “despite the 
constant threat of terrorism.” One might also read this as adulterated 
chutzpah whose rhetoric embraces audacity but neglects ethics. 
Opportunities for civil cross-communications which could possibly 
ameliorate the Israeli-Palestinian stand-off are being denied, according to 
Stephen Krasner. He claims that technological innovators might find means 
of easing movement of goods over the borders to the benefit of both 
Palestinians and Jews, and at least in the short-term, work can be outsourced 
and education can be undertaken remotely.55 He sees it as unlikely that the 
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Palestinian authority would curtail such freedom of movement, and it is 
possible that the more hard-line Hamas’ policies would become less popular 
amongst a people with a significantly lowered unemployment rate and better 
living standards. Krasner claims also that many of the calls for boycotts, 
divestments, and sanctions against Israel could become redundant if such 
initiatives were pursued alongside other necessary infrastructural, job-
creating improvements. That this is not already a mainstream focus for 
improvement is concerning. Organisations such as PITA (Palestinian 
Information and Technology Association) exist; however, Israeli control of 
Palestinian infrastructure has hindered rather than helped development, with 
40% of the Palestinian telecom market being lost to interference from 
unauthorised Israeli operators (60m USD loss to the PA) per year according 
to the charity, the World Association for Christian Communication.56 
It may be that this attitude within Israeli business and industrial culture 
is an aspect of the conscious or unconscious embrace of the image of the 
nationalistic ‘New Jew’,57 with whom so many Israelis identify, as opposed 
to the exilic ‘weak’ or ‘gentle’ Jew.58 Breines had hoped, writing in the 
1980s, that his book Tough Jews would contribute “to kindling thought that 
refuses to bow to toughness and nationalism as the inevitable horizons of 
political and social life.”59 Indeed, in the 1990s it had seemed that there was 
reason for optimism regarding the relationship between Jewish Israelis and 
Palestinians. This was, according to Naomi Klein, in part because war was 
no longer considered a viable option; negotiations continued because Israel 
did not want to be constrained by involvement in conflict in the emerging 
globalised, borderless world. However, at the moment some Israelis appear 
to be immersed in a form of nationalism which is enjoying the profits to be 
made from conflict and mistrust, for Israel has instead developed an 
economy “based on the premise of continuing wars and deepening 
disasters.”60  
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The Rhetoric of ‘Strength’ and Righteousness 
Today, Israel attends less to the idea of a heritage of history of shame and 
weakness61 and more to the narrative mentioned above, of an innovative, 
pioneering nation characterised by strength and will that their forebears from 
the shtetl could not possibly have imagined. Israel is in large part a product 
of revolutionary Zionist idealism and the myth of the Sabra—a term with 
refers to those members of the pioneering youth groups who came to 
Palestine before 1948, and the following generation. ‘Sabras’ are named for 
a desert fruit (prickly pear) that resists attack by virtue of its spikes. It 
represents the new, strong ‘manly, hard Jew’, the polar opposite of the pale, 
pious yeshiva boy of the European past (although, arguably no less parodic 
than the pallid skullcapped student or the shyster, the Jewish New York 
gangster, or for that matter, Svengali and Shylock, beloved of antisemites 
worldwide).  
The mythology of the Sabra, the European Jew rejuvenated through 
aliyah (or ‘ascending’, emigrating or ‘returning’ to Israel), played its part 
then and continues today. Carlo Strenger asserts that the “New Jew … should 
cause to be forgotten for all time the weak, over-intellectual Jew.”62 Idith 
Zertal recognises what Ella Shohat terms a ‘rupture’ with exilic Jewishness 
and avows that “revolutionary Zionism negated not only the Diaspora’s way 
of life; it intended to utterly obliterate the Diasporic soul of the Zionists 
themselves, and along with it … the entire two thousand-year history of the 
Exile.”63 Daniel Boyarin views this “negation of the Diaspora” alongside the 
“rejection of the ‘feminized’ Jew of the Diaspora in favor of the new 
masculine pioneer [as] ‘a cultural capitulation that does not honor Jewish 
difference’.”64 Such a totalising reaction against one’s forebears, one’s 
past—of history itself—may be seen as an effort to create a timeless, 
ahistorical present, an image explored at length by late Israeli novelist Amos 
Oz.65 But in this tenseless present the enemy inevitably and eternally 
continues “to rise up against us to annihilate us”—a point that Arendt has 
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hotly contested. Alternately, it is a vacuum wherein the past, rather than 
being reflected upon and learned from, is largely ignored. In its place is “an 
ideology of toughness, paranoia in the face of difference, and violence [a 
framework] commonly referred to as ‘realism’.”66  
This fierce, overtly war-like ‘realism’ is not an Israeli idiosyncrasy. It 
is an attitude accepted worldwide, and it is hard to argue against the ‘realism’ 
of ‘toughness’: one must be tough to survive. Historically, Israel has been, 
and is, vulnerable to ‘strongman’ rhetoric. Former general, Matan Vilnai, 
claimed in 2008: “The more Qassam fire intensifies [from Gaza] and the 
rockets reach a longer range, they will bring upon themselves a bigger 
Shoah” (the term usually used synonymously with ‘holocaust’).67 Very 
recently, Benjamin Netanyahu tweeted, “In the Middle East, and in many 
parts of the world … there is a simple truth: There is no place for the weak 
… The weak crumble, are slaughtered and are erased from history while the 
strong, for good or ill, survive.”68  
The strongman narrative is assisted by a belief in aloneness against the 
world; the implication is that ruthlessness is the only way to assure survival. 
This stance is not peculiarly Israeli but is certainly adopted by Israel and 
emerges in the claim of ‘nobody to talk to’ about a peace process. Guy Ziv 
has explored the now entrenched public belief in this assertion which he 
claims has been rejected by Israel’s security community for decades, and 
which contradicts military advice regarding questions of national security. 
Nevertheless, at the time of his re-election in 2015 Netanyahu reiterated that 
“there are no forces for peace, no partner for peace” to justify avoiding 
negotiations. This stance aligns well with his instrumental political 
ambitions, and again in his 2019 re-election bid, when this persistent belief 
was used alongside the strategy of alarming Israelis of a forthcoming 
existential crisis should they support the centrist parties opposing him, even 
though these parties were led by former security officials.69 
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It is through language that our perceptions are shaped and our 
purposes defined. ‘Nobody to talk to’ is similar in effect to other oft-repeated 
dead-end phrases such as ‘this is the reality…’, ‘the hard facts are…’, and 
‘There Is No Alternative’. They are all weaponised clichés to shoot down 
opposition. In the absence of a peace partner there can be no peace process 
and therefore no need to consider adaptation to or accommodation with the 
other. This policy continues today, and at the time of writing with unabashed 
talk of annexation. The ongoing war of attrition played out in cycles of 
attack/counterattack, humiliation/revenge continues even though the 
‘strongest’ has already claimed all the land between the Mediterranean and 
the Jordan River, wherein over five million Palestinians negotiate daily 
Israel’s roadblocks and checkpoints, its walls and electric fences, and basic 
rights of citizenship continue to be denied. As a former assistant mayor of 
Jerusalem observed: “A bi-national state isn’t a nightmare of the future, it’s 
the current reality.”70 Zionism’s nationalist aspirations have largely 
succeeded, and as Hannah Arendt predicted in 1948, it has come to pass that,  
the ‘victorious’ Jews [are] absorbed with physical self-defense to the 
degree that [has submerged] all other interests … political thought 
[centres] around military strategy; economic development [is] 
determined exclusively by the needs of war.71  
Violence is the lingua franca, so the logic flows that without 
toughness one can be victimised and abused; one can be annihilated. There 
is boundless evidence showing that brutality is the way the world works, but 
there is also boundless evidence showing that it is how the world fails to 
work. “Eternal war,” as former Mossad chief Shabtai Shavit drily points out, 
“is not a strategy.”72 Neither is perpetual subjugation of a large part of the 
nation’s—any nation’s—population. The expectation that all Muslims, 
Christians, Druze, and Bedouin, denied any possibility of self-determination 
in perpetuity will never act with aggression or always fail if they do, is far 
more unrealistic than seeking just ways of cohabiting.  
 
Against Outrage and Despair 
“Judaism begins and ends with a story. If Christianity is to a great extent 
about doctrine and Islam about ritual, Judaism is about narrative. To be a Jew 
is to tell and retell a story.”73 The most told and retold story is that of exile 
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and return, yet there are Jewish Israelis who have the chutzpah—in the sense 
mentioned earlier, of ethical inquiry—to attempt to change the terms and 
nature of this return. As the time for her military service approached, 
eighteen-year old Yasmin Ricci-Yahav wrote,  
I will not accept the endless repetition of sayings such as ‘we have no 
partner for peace’, ‘we have no one to talk to’ and ‘force is the only 
option’. I am refusing military service with the hope of advancing a 
more open and critical discourse, especially among young people, 
about the army’s ongoing role in carrying out the Occupation. I hope 
my decision will contribute, in however small a way, to a gradual 
change of consciousness. And that this change will lead in turn to a 
search for a solution based on justice and equality for Israelis and 
Palestinians.74 
Ricci-Yahav’s modest yet forceful voice brings to mind Havel’s view of 
hope, which “is not the same as joy that things are going well, or willingness 
to invest in enterprises that are obviously headed for early success, but, 
rather, an ability to work for something because it is good.”75 
Similarly overcoming what Arendt referred to as “the narrowness of 
caste spirit,”76 an anonymous teenage blogger, shortly after her release from 
prison for refusing military service in 2019, discussed her change of attitude 
towards Palestinians after she attended a summer peace program:  
I knew a little bit about the things happening in Palestine, but on some 
level I thought … they kind of deserved it. Because what we were 
taught is that it is controlled by terrorists, and that they just won’t let 
us have our land that we deserve … So I talked to these Palestinian 
kids who hadn’t seen their uncle or their grandparents in years, 
because they can’t get out of the West Bank to go to Gaza, and they 
can’t pass the checkpoint, they’re not legal citizens…and they don’t 
have many rights. It was ridiculous to me. Why are you treating 
someone like a second-class citizen, just because they’re not Jewish 
or just because they’re Arab? It was very hard for me to understand 
that the whole conflict is more complicated than history class … but 
there’s a limit to what teachers can say without getting fired.77  
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Plenty has been written on forms of indoctrination in the education system 
in Israel and the disparities in educational opportunities between Israeli and 
Palestinian children, where more than three times as much is invested in the 
children of Jewish citizens than of Palestinians78 and on the European 
narrative occupying a privileged place within its mandated curriculum.79 Yet 
Hilla Dayan, while seeing Israeli universities “as the end point of 
segregation, exclusion, and denial of education,” still speaks to the concept 
of a “politics for hope,”80 a concept akin to Havel’s insistence that, “the more 
unpropitious the situation in which we demonstrate hope, the deeper that 
hope.”81 A fine example of this striving against the odds is that of 
Gazan/Canadian doctor and peace activist Izzeldin Abuelaish, whose three 
daughters were killed during Operation Cast Lead in 2009. Abuelaish later 
wrote not a justifiable fury-filled diatribe, but a memoir titled I Shall Not 
Hate, the corollary being, ‘I shall hope’.82 The following year he founded the 
Daughters for Life Foundation, which offers accessible education to girls and 
young women from Middle Eastern countries, including Israel. Rebecca 
Solnit83 has written passionately in defence of hope and the cynicism of the 
‘realist’, and well before her revolutionary teacher Paolo Freire wrote that it 
is hope, not ‘realism’, that galvanises people to struggle against oppressive 
masters. Action must follow or “hope, as an ontological need, dissipates … 
and turns into hopelessness. And hopelessness can become tragic despair. 
Hence the need for a kind of education in hope.”84 In fact there are education 
programs such as the one attended by the anonymous refusenik mentioned 
above, as well as human rights organisations within Israel/Palestine and in 
the Diaspora who work towards recognition of the other as a human being 
rather than an irredeemable enemy.  
Regarding ‘action’, some argue that it is a moral and practical 
imperative to divide Israel/Palestine into two discrete nations, although 
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Israel’s separationism has thus far not succeeded in anything resembling a 
solution to the Conflict; it is, as Alain Weaver has said, about “managing” 
it.85 Many voices from diverse political leanings insist that opportunities for 
two-state solution have failed. For others, it is not the central issue. A 
Palestinian I talked with in Jerusalem in 2019 mentioned dryly that it does 
not make much difference if it is your neighbour next door who hates you, 
or the one across the road from behind a fence. In any case, Israel is already, 
effectively, a bi-national state, though “a wretched form” of it.86 Some view 
the idea of bi-nationalism as a rather feeble utopian view. That said, while 
acknowledging the complexities involved in solving so many inequities, 
Gideon Levy asks ironically, “Why is it so scary to live in an egalitarian state 
[when] all other possibilities are much scarier?”87 He declares that even 
today, conscious and democratic change is still an option, regardless of the 
chilling similarity to the zeitgeist described by Arendt in 1948: 
Even more surprising than the growing unanimity of opinion among 
Palestinian Jews on one hand and Americna Jews on the other is the 
fact that they are essentially in agreement [that] Arabs—all Arabs—
are our enemies … only outmoded liberals believe in compromises, 
only philistines believe in justice, and only schlemiels prefer truth and 
negotiation to propaganda and machine-guns.88  
It is important to note, however, that for Arendt, the schlemiel is 
neither incompetent nor stupid but has an honesty which affords him clear 
sight, an outcast, a pariah, who “challenges an evil philosophical and 
political status quo.”89 Her insistence that Jewish/Palestinian cooperation is 
essential in the most practical sense has not dated either, for, “no matter how 
many immigrants it could absorb and how far it extended its boundaries 
[Israel] would still remain a very small people greatly outnumbered.”90 She 
concludes that a homeland is the “real goal of the Jews in Palestine [and 
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must] never be sacrificed to the pseudo-sovereignty of a Jewish state.”91 That 
is, for her the homeland is a political space without sovereignty, or even a 
majority in Palestine, where rather than disowning one’s exilic heritage, 
respect for the best of Jewishness would not be surrendered to Zionist 
political demands which she saw as unrealistic then, and in light of the 
ongoing horror of the Conflict, only seem increasingly so today.  
 
The Hyphen 
Hitmazrehut, or “becoming of the East”92 represents an alternative 
geopolitical framing to the European Jewish Israeli hegemony. The concept 
hinges on pursuing a sense of identity attached to the locale itself rather than 
the current mainstream Israeli identification with the West. Yet Ashkenazim 
are called to disown diasporic culture, as have the Mizrahim, for whom this 
for whom this has meant shedding their Arab affiliation and identity and 
“acquiescing in assimilationist modernization, for ‘their own good’.”93 
However, according to Atalia Omer, the Mizrahim are “at least potentially 
able to think about inhabiting Middle Eastern spaces outside the messianic 
paradigm.”94 She asks what a non-orientalist Israel would like. Seemingly 
gaining energy from the challenge to the “binary logic of Zionism” afforded 
by the term “Arab-Jew,” she speaks to the possibility of “inhabiting the 
hyphen.”95 There have, after all, been instances of joint Mizrahi-Palestinian 
activism amongst those who recognise their common struggle.96 Edward 
Said also, while mindful of the very different nature and circumstances of 
Jewish and Palestinian dispersement and displacement, has pointed out that 
awareness of their own history of disenfranchisement can lead Jews away 
from the limits of defensive clannishness to ally themselves with other 
dispossessed people97 and for some, it has.  
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A Diasporic Dispensation 
Goran Rosenberg revisits Rabbi Marcus Ehrenpreis’ assertion that Judaism 
depends upon the Diaspora. Having survived centuries of persecution and 
assimilation, the only thing that Judaism could not survive is “Jewish self-
effacement,” which for him occurs when Judaism’s spiritual force is lost, for 
this “reduces Judaism to a political and militarized state.”98 As an agnostic, 
‘spiritual force’ is a difficult phrase; however, it might be interpreted with 
reference to Butler’s identification of traditional commitment to social 
justice as the “ethical substance of diasporic Jewishness.” Butler has 
emphasised “affirming a different Jewishness than the one in whose name 
the Israeli state claims to speak,”99 one that aligns with Daniel and Jonathon 
Boyarin’s idea of importing to Israel a “diasporised” understanding of 
sharing the geographical space that is Israel/Palestine. Diaspora, then, 
becomes “the principle that must be brought home to Israel/Palestine in order 
to ground a polity where no one religion or nationality may claim sovereignty 
over another.”100  
Weaver’s formulation is similar in its championing of democracy over 
ethnocracy: “a third way between exile from the land and nationalist 
sovereignty [wherein] sharing the land with others is a normal state of 
affairs.”101 It is a political model where one’s identity is “shaped through 
one’s opening to and encounter with the other.” Such a shift towards 
understanding oneself in relation to the other in politics would have to apply 
to both Jews and Palestinians; but for Jews, specifically, it would mean 
abandoning the exclusivism of Jewish-centred nation-statism, with its 
“obsessions with demographic and border control.”102  
“Diaspora,” for the Boyarins and Weaver as well as Butler, is 
adamantly not “a symptom of disorder,” nor need it mean estrangement. 
Rather, it is a political category that disrupts the association of ethnicity with 
hegemony. “Exilic consciousness”103 is a product of diasporic tradition, not 
necessarily limited to diasporic Jews, that has been derogated for centuries, 
and which the ‘New Jew’, and now, many Israeli citizens have dismissed as 
a shameful condition of abjection and a danger to the continued existence of 
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the Jewish people. Yet one might argue back—as Judith Butler has—that 
violently subjugating people and refusing them basic rights is certainly a way 
to court aggression, and that it is in fact in the Diaspora that Jews have 
survived as a people for millennia. One could reverse the argument to view 
Diaspora not as a tragic condition that can be only be redeemed by a return 
to Israel, but actually Jewish people’s saving grace. Boyarin and Boyarin 
advocate, 
a privileging of Diaspora, a dissociation of ethnicities and political 
hegemonies as the only social structure that even begins to make 
possible a maintenance of cultural identity in a world grown 
thoroughly and inextricably interdependent. Indeed, we would 
suggest that Diaspora … may be the most important contribution that 
Judaism has to make to the world … that peoples and lands are not 
naturally and organically connected.104 
 
Conclusion 
This article has looked, too briefly, I fear, at the complexities of national 
identification in Israel/Palestine, taking into consideration the 
interrelationships of shame and victimhood with triumphalist sources of self- 
and nationalist esteem. Also discussed were some of the stories we tell 
ourselves and how the language used to tell them may be used either to 
bolster, or to question, treasured conceptions of self and place. This analysis 
has led to consideration of the respect owed to the concept of Diaspora, 
which as the Boyarins, Judith Butler, Marcus Ehrenpreis and others have 
claimed is not “a regrettable interregnum in the history of Judaism, but … its 
very foundation.”105 This is not antisemitic. In fact, it is prosemitic. I have 
attempted to address the possibility that Jews of Israel and the Diaspora can 
negotiate a pathway through the turmoil with help from traditions other than 
an exclusivist Eurocentric chauvinism. Nothing is set in stone. Indeed, as 
Israel’s former Shin Bet security agency chief Ami Ayalon (2020) affirmed 
recently, “The strength of Zionism is that our fate is in our hands. Not God’s. 
Not some historical forces beyond our control. We can still decide to change 
direction and avert disaster … I even [quote] Herzl’s motto, ‘If you will it, it 
is no fairy tale.’” 
The final part of this essay has summarised some of the work of others 
who, like Ayalon, have considered possibilities for change within what is 
currently a system in which justice has failed: Omer’s image of in-
 
104 Boyarin and Boyarin, Diaspora, pp. 722-723. 
105 Quoted in Rosenberg, ‘Is Israel Good for the Diaspora?’, p. 30. 




betweenness or liminality recalls Weaver and Daniel Boyarin’s “third way” 
between exile and nationalist sovereignty; Goran Rosenberg’s evocation of 
“a new path for Judaism between Zion and Diaspora.”106 The ‘hyphen’ 
subverts the Ashkenazi prescription against other ways of being Jewish, has 
the potential to disentangle identity from harshly limiting 
communitarianism, and looks instead towards ways of being European or 
Arab, Jewish or non-Jewish in Israel/Palestine. This may sound absurdly 
utopian. However, the destruction of diasporic consciousness, the 
annihilation of Palestinian and Mizrahi identity, or perpetual war, are surely 




106 Rosenberg, ‘Is Israel Good for the Diaspora?’, p. 33. 
